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By E-Mail and Regular Mail
February 1, 2001
European Commission
Internal Market DG
Financial Services – Financial Reporting
Attention: Mr. Michael Niehues
Rue de la Loi 200 / Wetstraat 200
B-1049 Bruxelles / B-1049 Brussel
E-mail: Michael.Niehues@cec.eu.int
Dear Mr. Niehues:
We are pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the European
Commission’s consultative paper, “Statutory Auditors’
Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles.” Our
comments reflect the views of the Independence Standards Board’s
staff, and not necessarily those of the Board.
Harmonization
It is gratifying to see the current focus on auditor independence
throughout the world, and the degree of similarity in approach taken
by the Commission, the Federation des Experts Comptables
Europeens, the International Federation of Accountants, and the
ISB. We believe a principles-based threats and safeguards
approach, that considers the expectations of investors and other
stakeholders, is the most effective way to develop consistent and
coherent standards that protect the public interest. We endorse the
Commission's test of independence; that is, whether "a reasonable
and informed third party, knowing all the relevant facts and
circumstances about a particular audit engagement, will conclude
that the statutory auditor...is exercising objective and impartial
judgment on all issues brought to his attention (A)."
We are also pleased to see the Commission’s proposed adoption of
requirements similar to those in ISB Standard No. 1, Independence
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Discussions with Audit Committees, and ISB Standard No. 3,
Employment with Audit Clients. We agree with the Commission’s
conclusion that independence can never be absolute – that the
auditor cannot be completely free from all economic, financial, and
other relationships that could appear to entail dependence of any
kind. Finally, we support, in most cases, an approach of limiting
restrictions and prohibitions to those within the firm that are “in a
position to influence the outcome of the audit.”
Definition of Independence
We believe that a clearer definition of auditor independence would
improve the Commission’s framework. The document differentiates
between independence in mind and independence in appearance, but
also describes independence as a means of demonstrating objectivity
and professional integrity. We understand the view that
independence could be defined as compliance with a set of
restrictions on relationships with audit clients as a means of
demonstrating objectivity, but then we are not sure how this relates
to the other components in the described model.
The basic test of independence described in the first sentence of the
document (A) states that the auditor should have “neither mutual nor
conflicting interests with the audit client.” We do not believe that
this clause adds clarity to the test, as the auditor, for example, may
have a mutual interest with the client in reliable financial reporting,
and a conflicting interest in negotiating audit fees.
The document uses the term “impair” or “impairment” when
describing circumstances that would cause the auditor to be
considered not independent. When drafting the ISB’s conceptual
framework, we found that many people understood the term
“impairment” to describe circumstances that “affected”
independence, rather than those that rose to the level of causing
unacceptable independence risk. In other words, the term implied
that perfect independence was attainable, and that any threats
affecting the auditor’s independence were unacceptable. We found
that the term “compromise” caused less confusion, in that people
generally understood that we were describing circumstances that
crossed a threshold (acceptable risk vs. unacceptable risk) in
affecting the auditor’s independence.
Evaluating the Acceptability of Independence Risk
The Commission’s framework is consistent with the ISB’s in calling
for an analysis of the significance of threats to independence, the
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effectiveness of potential safeguards, and the acceptability of
independence risk. We suggest that the discussion regarding
independence risk could be enhanced, however. The term is not
defined, and guidance is not provided on assessing the acceptability
of independence risk. Most importantly, the level of acceptable risk
might vary based on cost / benefit considerations. That is, the cost
of additional safeguards (e.g., unintended consequences of
regulations that ultimately decrease the quality of financial reporting
and user reliance on audited financial statements) may exceed the
benefit of reduced independence risk. The framework, however,
does not explicitly provide for cost / benefit analysis in setting
standards.
Cost / benefit analysis may be particularly helpful in articulating
why safeguards should be, in some cases, less restrictive when
auditing non-public-interest clients. For example, the document
states that self-review concerns arising from the provision of
bookkeeping services are higher for public interest clients, and
therefore the auditor should not perform these services, regardless of
the level of assistance requested (B.7.21). The rationale for more
stringent requirements on public interest clients (and less restrictive
standards on other audits) is not clearly articulated, beyond the
potentially larger group of stakeholders associated with public
interest clients who may have negative perceptions of these services.
We believe such distinctions in the application of safeguards may be
appropriate in certain circumstances, when costs and benefits are
considered, but that this analysis and conclusion should be clearly
articulated in the standards.
Threat Analysis
A more robust analysis of threats and safeguards as they apply to
specific situations would enhance the document. The threats are
generally listed in the black letter sections of the requirements (i.e.,
self –interest, advocacy, etc.). Mandatory or suggested safeguards,
including prohibitions and restrictions, follow. Sometimes,
however, the nature or origin of the threat is unclear. For example,
some might wonder why litigation poses a self-interest threat to the
auditor’s independence. The effect of the suggested safeguard may
also need elaboration. Even an auditor well versed in independence
matters may wonder why discussion with the audit committee might
adequately mitigate the threat posed by litigation (B.9).
Guidance on how the auditor should consider appearances is
sketchy. In some cases, threats to the appearance of independence
are discussed in a way that gives the impression that the relationship
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in question does not pose an actual threat to independence. For
example, dependency on fees from a client, in our view, poses a real
threat to the auditor’s independence, yet much of the discussion in
this section focuses on the appearance of dependency (B.8.2).
Standards should not permit an individual professional or the firm to
act as auditor if threats to independence are not adequately
mitigated. In that connection, a strengthened threat and safeguard
analysis when applying the principles to specific relationships might
lead to changes in the requirements. For example, the threats posed
by significant financial interests in the audit client held by an
engagement team member are not mitigated when the professional
receives the financial interest by gift or inheritance. The
requirement to dispose of the financial interest at the earliest
practicable date (which may not be in the near future), and to
consider safeguards such as review of the individual’s work or
exclusion of the professional from substantive decision making,
does not seem to adequately address the threats, including those
related to appearance (B.1.(2)).
Similarly, a “significance test” in prohibiting certain business
relationships between the audit client and those who could influence
the outcome of the audit does not adequately address appearance
threats, and fails a cost – benefit test. Why allow the engagement
partner to loan money to his or her audit client, or to guarantee the
client’s debt, however insignificant (B.2.)?
Finally, the threats raised by audit firm professionals assuming
employment positions at their audit clients would seem to apply to
other engagement team members, particularly more senior members,
as well as to the engagement partner. Why shouldn’t the firm
review the relationships of these former firm professionals with
remaining engagement team members? Similarly, the threats posed
by unsettled financial interests might apply to former firm
professionals in important positions at the client regardless of
whether they were previously involved in the audit, or part of the
chain of command.
The document states that a threat can be considered significant “if,
considering all of its quantitative and qualitative aspects, it increases
the level of independence risk to an unacceptable high level” (A.3.).
We believe that this sentence is confusing, as it implies that:


threats may be analyzed and dismissed individually, as long
as they do not raise independence risk to an unacceptably
high level on a stand-alone basis; and
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independence risk should be assessed before the effect of
safeguards.

Responsibility for Compliance
The framework sometimes places too much responsibility on the
engagement partner for determining the application of and
compliance with the independence rules (A.2.). In view of the size
and structure of large firms today, the framework should
acknowledge that individual engagement partners are unable to
ensure compliance with the independence rules by the firm and
other firms within a network, and by firm employees able to
influence the outcome of the audit including those in the chain of
command. This responsibility should rest, as the framework later
states, with the firm, which has the ability to determine to whom
restrictions should apply, and to put quality controls in place to
promote and monitor compliance. While we understand that the
appointed statutory auditor, who may be an individual, might have
legal responsibility in some jurisdictions for compliance, we believe
this assignment of responsibility is unrealistic in a framework that
extends restrictions beyond the appointed statutory auditor to a
potentially large group of individuals in the firm, to the firm itself,
and to other individuals and firms within a network.
Limiting Restrictions to Those Able to Influence the Outcome of the
Audit
We support, in most cases, limiting restrictions to the firm and to
those professionals with the ability to influence the outcome of the
audit. The requirements sometimes carry this notion too far,
however, without obvious benefit. Recognizing that to some extent
the activities and relationships of firm professionals are attributed to
the firm, we believe standards should prohibit all firm professionals
from having certain relationships with firm audit clients. For
example, we do not believe that firm professionals should serve as
employees or board members of audit clients, or act as underwriters
for an audit client’s securities. Similarly, none of the firm’s
professionals should be permitted to maintain the accounting records
of the client.
In addition, while we agree that many of the financial interest
prohibitions should be limited to those able to influence the outcome
of the audit, some limitations should apply to other firm
professionals. We believe, for example, that it would be
inappropriate for a firm to audit a company over which one or more
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of its professionals can exercise control or significant influence.
Family and Other Personal Relationships
The requirements apply employment and financial restrictions to
close family members of the engagement team and the chain of
command (B.6). We would distinguish between immediate and
other close family members in applying restrictions (i.e., applying
more stringent restrictions to immediate family members).
In addition, because restrictions are applied evenly to a larger group
of relatives, clarification is needed on the auditor’s responsibility to
inquire about the investment holdings of, for example, parents and
siblings. If the auditor does not have this investigative
responsibility, then the requirements should clarify these limits and
state that the auditor must only act on those relationships of which
he or she becomes aware.
We believe that the auditor should be expected to have knowledge
of the investments of those in his or her household (immediate
family members), but not the investments of other close family
members. Furthermore, investments of other close family members
can only compromise the auditor’s independence if they are known
and are material to both the auditor and the close family member.
Internal Audit Services
The requirements call for review of internal audit work by a partner
uninvolved in the statutory audit or the internal audit engagement,
presumably when the audit team will rely on the internal audit work
to change the nature, timing, or extent of their own procedures
(B.7.2.4(2)(b)). We do not believe this is necessary and would
impose additional costs without benefit.
The auditor may rely on the internal auditor’s work (control and
substantive testing) after evaluating the internal auditor’s
competence and objectivity, and testing the effectiveness of the
internal auditor’s work. Whether to rely on the internal auditor’s
work, or to perform such work himself or herself, is the auditor’s
prerogative and is a question of efficiency. Since the auditor has
this choice – to rely on the work of the internal auditor, after
performing the required evaluations, or to have an audit team
member perform the work, which is subject to standard review
procedures - why are extra steps necessary when audit firm
professionals perform internal audit work?
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In addition, we question whether the term “the internal audit
function” in B.7.2.4(2)(a)(i) should be replaced with “internal
controls.”
Fees
Fee dependency is a complex topic. In one sense it is easier to
assess and measure than other threats to independence, such as
familiarity – there are hard numbers available to assist in assessing
the significance of the client to the firm. On the other hand, the
significance of a client to an engagement partner’s compensation
and career may be harder to measure; sometimes the loss of an
average-sized client of the firm may have significant adverse
consequences to a firm professional. The profitability of services
provided, the reputational value of the client association, and
whether the engagement is a recurring one must also be factored into
the assessment.
Recognizing the difficulty of the subject, we still find the guidance
provided on fee dependency confusing and difficult to apply (B.8.2).
The black letter guidance states that services provided should not be
allowed to create a financial dependency on the client, in fact or
appearance. Later, we are told to have another audit partner
uninvolved in the audit or in the provision of non-audit services
review all work performed by the firm for the client if there is some
level of dependency.
We do not understand why “independence may be particularly
compromised” by fees for non-audit services. While additional
focus on non-audit engagements may be appropriate when fee
dependency is in question, because of their recurring nature, audit
fees may pose a greater threat to the auditor’s independence than
fees received on a one-off non-audit engagement.
A test based on fees in relation to revenues in each of the last 5
years seems liberal. Isn’t there a question of dependency if fees
from a client are, for example, 25% of the firm’s revenues in each of
the last 2 years?
Finally, in the black letter guidance on overdue fees, we are told that
auditors should not accept engagements where overdue fees could
be considered a loan. The commentary, however, suggests that
disclosure to relevant third parties might adequately mitigate this
threat (B.8.3).
Litigation
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The second paragraph of the black letter guidance (B.9.(2)) states
that the auditor should “cease to act” as soon as litigation becomes
evident, which implies resignation from the engagement.
Resignation, however, is only one of the remedies provided in the
next sentence.
Other Comments
We are not sure that the requirements provide enough guidance on
the application of independence rules to entities affiliated with the
firm in alternative practice structures.
The requirements prohibit the provision of audit services to nonauditor owners holding more than 5% of firm voting rights
(B.4.3.1(2)). We suggest that the prohibition also be operative if the
stock is held by the entity’s officers, directors, or significant
shareholders.
In discussing non-audit services, the auditor is cautioned to avoid
making decisions on behalf of the client. The auditor is told to
provide management with the opportunity to decide between
reasonable alternatives, or to document the situation if legal or
regulatory provisions allow only one course of action (B.7.1). We
suggest that there may be other situations where alternatives are not
limited by legal or regulatory constraints, yet only one feasible
alternative exists.
****
We would be pleased to discuss these comments with you. Best
wishes for success in this important and worthwhile project.
Sincerely,

Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
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